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American politics in the 1990s is preoccupied with the move-
ment of power from a centralized federal authority to state and local
governments. There is some measure of consensus that the federal
government can no longer provide solutions to all of America's prob-
lems., The resulting retreat from the twentieth century federal mono-
lith has interesting implications for constitutional law. The federal
government's power expanded largely under the authority of the
Commerce Clause. Although the traditional broad interpretation of
Congress's commerce power bears little resemblance to the actual text
of the Constitution, courts have accepted the notion that Congress
may regulate any activity that it reasonably believes could affect in-
terstate commerce. 2 In 1995, however, the Supreme Court, in the
landmark decision of United States v. Lopez,a held the Gun-Free
School Zones Act unconstitutional as beyond the scope of the com-
merce power.4
This Note evaluates the significance of that decision to the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE Act"). 5 Developed
in response to the violent and obstructionist tactics of some anti-abor-
tion activists, the FACE Act prohibits the intimidation of patients
seeking access to reproductive health care.6 This Note analyzes the
FACE Act's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, concluding
that while Lopez does not unequivocally call for overturning the act, it
provides strong authority for such an argument. This Note contends
that a challenge to the FACE Act should be sustained by the Supreme
Court because the statute exceeds meaningful limits on the
Commerce Clause and because state law is better able to address the
problem of violent anti-abortion activity. Part II examines the legal
background of the Lopez decision, providing a basis to discuss the
impact of the decision. Part III focuses on the FACE Act, including its
legislative history and a recent interpretation given by the Seventh
Circuit. Part IV analyzes two views of how Lopez affects the FACE
Act. Finally, Part V examines another possible constitutional source
1. See, for example, Jonathan Alter, Washington Washes Its Hands, Newsweek 42, 42-44
(August 12, 1996) (describing landmark federal legislation handing responsibility for welfare
over to the states).
2. See Part II.LA 1.
3. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995).
4. Id. at 1634.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994 ed.).
6. Id. See Part III.A.
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of congressional power and offers two regulatory alternatives to the
FACE Act that better conform to a post-Lopez Commerce Clause.
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate com-
merce with other nations and among the states.7 The federal govern-
ment is a limited government with specifically enumerated powers.8
Because Congress has no authority to act unless the action falls
within one of the enumerated powers, the authority to regulate inter-
state commerce is significant. Furthermore, because the Commerce
Clause often serves as the authority under which the federal govern-
ment acts to regulate behavior otherwise outside its jurisdiction, the
interpretation of the scope of the Commerce Clause profoundly affects
the balance of power between the federal and state governments. 9
During most of American history, the commerce power was
interpreted literally as "commerce among the states."1° By the mid-
7. "Congress shall have the power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States .... U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
8. Congress's powers are listed in Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. Aside from the
commerce power, the taxing power and the spending power are the most significant of
Congress's powers. See generally Gerald Gunther, Costitutional Law 176-201 (Foundation
Press, 12th ed. 1991) (describing the history of the Taxing and Spending Clauses).
9. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ('CThis clause has throughout
the Court's history been the chief source of its adjudications regarding federalism .... ")
(quoting Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite 66-67 (U.
of North Carolina, 1937)).
10. The starting point for commerce clause jurisprudence is Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheaton) 1 (1824), in which Chief Justice Marshall examined the congressional power over
interstate commerce. Holding that a federal statute preempted a New York law granting a
monopoly to operators of a ferry between New York City and New Jersey, id. at 221, the Court
concluded that Congress's power over commerce "cannot stop at the external boundary line of
each State, but may be introduced into the interior." Id. at 194. Furthermore, while Gibbons
established the plenary power of Congress over interstate commerce, this power did not extend
to the "completely internal commerce of a state." Id. at 195.
Until the end of the nineteenth century, the Court's dealings with the Commerce Clause
almost exclusively concerned analyzing whether state laws interfered with interstate commerce.
See, for example, Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 Howard)
299, 315-16 (1851) (holding that a Pennsylvania statute regulating ships entering or leaving the
port of Philadelphia did not unduly interfere with Congress's commerce power). With
Congress's enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890, focus shifted from the negative, or dormant, aspect of the Commerce Clause to its
affirmative grant of power. Examining an application of the latter in United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), the Court formulated the direct/indirect distinction. It concluded
that intrastate manufacture only indirectly affected commerce, id. at 12, and it therefore
dismissed an antitrust action against a sugar refinery that controlled 98% of the nation's
refining capacity. Id. at 17-18. The Court examined the Interstate Commerce Act in Houston E.
& W. Texas Railway Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) ("The Shreveport Rate Case"). In
this case, the Court upheld federal regulation of intrastate rail rates which had a "close and
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twentieth century, however, the power to regulate comfiaerce had
expanded to give Congress the power to regulate a wide range of
activities, even when only remotely connected to commerce among the
states.
A. The Commerce Clause Historically: The Legal Background to
United States v. Lopez
During the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Supreme Court
expanded its interpretation of the scope of the Commerce Clause to
accommodate the economic and social reforms of the New Deal.
Previously, litigants had successfully challenged congressional acts
based on distinctions between manufacturing and commerce or be-
tween indirect and direct effects on commerce. Under the Court's
analysis, manufacturing was a purely local activity that had only an
indirect effect on commerce; thus Congress could not regulate it under
the commerce power.1 The Court gradually eliminated these formal
restrictions on the commerce power, and in subsequent years, the
Commerce Clause became nearly limitless in scope and application.
In deference to Congress, the Court has consistently maintained an
expansive reading of the Clause. While the litany of decisions illus-
trating the development of the commerce power is not unfamiliar,12 a
few cases merit brief discussion.
substantial relation" to interstate commerce. Id. at 355. Texas had lowered rail fares from
towns in East Texas to Dallas and Houston, making them much cheaper than the fare from
Shreveport -to these destinations, which the Interstate Commerce Commission ('ICC')
regulated. Id. at 346-47. The Court found that the ICC's power over the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce extended to intrastate commerce substantially affecting interstate com-
merce. See id. at 353.
11. For example, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Court struck down
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, a New Deal program that included wage and
hour regulations for the coal mining industry. Id. at 304. The Court found that the labor
provisions of the act regulated purely local production and not commerce. Id. at 304. In analyz-
ing whether Congress had authority to enact the statute, the Court asked whether the activity
being regulated had a direct or an indirect effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 307. It con-
cluded that the labor conditions had only an indirect effect. Id. at 308-09. For a discussion of
the roots of the direct/indirect distinction, see note 10.
12. See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va.
L. Rev. 1387, 1443-54 (1987) (describing the "New Deal Transformation of the Commerce
Clause"). See generally Gunther, Constitutional Law at 124-75 (cited in note 8).
[Vol. 50:239242
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1. Darby to Garcia
United States v. Darby13 illustrates the transformation in
commerce clause jurisprudence that occurred during the New Deal.
14
In Darby, the Supreme Court abandoned the formal distinction be-
tween manufacture and commerce, 15 concluding instead that Congress
may regulate intrastate activities that have a "substantial effect" on
interstate commerce. 16 The Court thus permitted the regulation of a
class of activities that affected interstate commerce, even though a
particular instance of that activity did not.17  For that reason, the
Court upheld the minimum wage and maximum hour requirements of
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").18
This expanded reading of the Commerce Clause continued in
Wickard v. Filburn.9 The Wickard Court examined the application of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act's production quotas to a local dairy
farmer who grew winter wheat.20 The Court abandoned the di-
rect/indirect distinction, ruling that even if homegrown wheat only
indirectly causes a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce, Congress may regulate its production.2' Despite the trivial
13. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
14. The first case of this transformation was NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937), which upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act. In this
case, the Court allowed Congress to regulate intrastate activities that bore such a "close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to
protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions." Id. at 37. In upholding the Act, the
Court effectively overruled Carter Coal. See id. at 40-41. Because this decision signaled a more
deferential approach to New Deal reforms, eliminating the need to pack the Court with friend-
lier justices, it has been called "the switch in time that saved nine." Daniel A. Farber, William
N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P. Frickey, Constitutional Law: Themes for the Constitution's Third
Century 20 (West, 1993).
15. See note 10.
16. 312 U.S. at 119. The Court framed the issue as "whether the employment . . . of
employees engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce is so related to the
commerce and so affects it as to be within the reach of the power of Congress to regulate it." Id.
at 117. The Court found that the Tenth Amendment did not limit the commerce power but
merely stated "a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." Id. at 124.
17. See id. at 117, 121-22. See also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152 (1971)
(describing the origins of the "class of activities" test).
18. The FLSA prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of goods made by employ-
ees who worked more than a certain maximum number of hours, were paid less than a certain
minimum wage per hour, or both. Darby, 312 U.S. at 108-09.
19. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
20. Id. at 114-15.
21. Id. at 125. The Court considered a portion of the Agricultural Adjustment Act that
imposed a penalty on farmers raising more wheat than a prescribed maximum. The quotas
applied not only to wheat that would be sold in commerce but also to wheat grown for personal
use. Id. at 119.
Justifying the Court's position, Justice Jackson wrote: "At the beginning Chief Justice
Marshall described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded." Id. at 120
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impact on interstate commerce of private consumption of homegrown
wheat, the Court sustained the Agricultural Adjustment Act because
collectively the class of activity could have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.
22
The Court continued the class of activities analysis when it
considered the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States23 and Katzenbach v.
McClung.24 Heart of Atlanta Motel concerned the application of the
Civil Rights Act to hotels, while McClung dealt with the Act in the
context of a restaurant. In the latter, the Court concluded that
Congress may regulate local establishments that receive goods in
interstate commerce. 25 Specifically, it held that Congress had a ra-
tional basis for concluding that racial discrimination by a private
restaurant that received food from out-of-state suppliers had a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.26  Following Wickard, the
Court reasoned that although such activity by one local restaurant
might have very little impact on interstate commerce, the aggregation
of that restaurant and others similarly situated could have a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce.2 7
The broad reading of the Commerce Clause continued in Perez
v. United States.28 In Perez, the Court upheld a federal criminal stat-
ute prohibiting "loan sharking," an activity that Congress found to be
largely controlled by organized crime.2 9  The Court deferred to
Congress's determination that purely intrastate extortionate credit
transactions affect interstate commerce. 30 Because the class of activi-
ties regulated affected interstate commerce, the Court upheld this
federal regulation of a local criminal act.31
(citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194-95). To this conclusion Professor Epstein responds, "No way."
Epstein, 73 Va. L. Rev. at 1408 (cited in note 12). He contends that Gibbons "stands in sharp
opposition to the very assertion of federal power that characterizes such cases as United States
v. Darby and Wickard v. Filburn." Id. at 1407 (citations omitted).
22. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28. The Court believed that farmers' consumption of home-
grown wheat instead of market wheat could, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on the
national wheat market. Id.
23. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
24. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). This case is more commonly known by the name of the local
restaurant involved in the litigation, Ollie's Barbecue.
25. Id. at 304-05.
26. Id. at 304. Its reasoning centered on the fact that Ollie's Barbecue purchased 46% of
its meat from out-of-state sources. Id. at 296.
27. Id. at 300-01.
28. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
29. Id. at 147. "loan sharking" involves the extension of credit with the understanding
that the creditor may use violence or other criminal means to enforce repayment. Id. at 147.
30. Id. at 154.
31. Id.
244 [Vol. 50:239
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While Darby, Wickard, McClung, and Perez demonstrate the
vast scope of the commerce power, the Court had to consider whether
other sections of the Constitution limit this power. In National
League of Cities v. Usery,32 the Court, while not limiting its earlier
holdings regarding the extent of Congress's power to regulate inter-
state commerce, concluded that the Tenth Amendment 33 did place a
substantive restriction on the commerce power.3 4 In doing so, the
Court employed a notion of state sovereignty to strike down federal
regulations passed under the commerce power. It found unconstitu-
tional provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act that pertained to
states as employers, determining that such provisions would interfere
with the core functions of the state and local governments. 35 Because
the regulations impaired the states' authority to govern in matters of
traditional state concern, the Court held that they were outside the
scope of the commerce power.36
Ten years later, however, the Court eliminated this substan-
tive restriction on the Commerce Clause by overruling National
League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.37 Examining a similar issue to that in National League of
32. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
33. The Tenth Amendment states, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. Const., Amend. X.
34. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 841-45.
35. Id. at 851.
36. Id. at 852.
37. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia, the Court held that a local transit authority must
adhere to the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act as
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause was not exceeded. Id. at 555-56.
Prior to Garcia, the Court had distinguished National League of Cities in Federal Energy
Regulatory Commn'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). There the Court upheld the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA'), portions of which were challenged under the
Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 758, 765-66. In response to a national
energy crisis, Congress had enacted PURPA, which was designed to increase the efficiency of
electricity utilities and lessen American dependence on foreign oil. Id. at 746. The state of
Mississippi challenged Titles I and III of the Act, which directed the states to "consider" imple-
menting federal regulatory measures, and § 210 of Title II, which required the states to adopt
certain Federal Energy Regulatory Commission rules concerning non-traditional electricity
generation facilities. Id. at 746-52. The Court readily determined that those provisions regulat-
ing private parties were within the scope of the commerce power, finding that Congress could
rationally conclude that a national energy crisis substantially impacted commerce. Id. at 755-
58. On the issue of whether the Tenth Amendment restricted Congress from using the states to
advance federal goals, however, the Court gave pause before sustaining the provisions. Despite
the fact that § 210 required the states to implement federal provisions, the Court concluded that
these could be implemented without compromising state sovereignty: "In essence, then, the
statute and the implementing regulations simply require the Mississippi authorities to
adjudicate disputes arising under the statute. Dispute resolution of this kind is the very type of
activity customarily engaged in by the Mississippi Public Service Commission." Id. at 760
(citations omitted).
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Cities, the Court turned away from any substantive notions of state
sovereignty as limiting federal power under the Commerce Clause.
38
Rather, it found that the states' involvement in federal decisionmak-
ing gave them a remedy through the political process.39 Garcia im-
plied, then, that if a statute contains the requisite connection to inter-
state commerce, it is constitutional despite any encroachment on
areas of traditional state authority.
More recently, however, the Court's decision in New York v.
United States40 has cast doubt on the continued authority of Garcia.
In striking down provisions of a federal statute that required states to
treat hazardous waste in a certain way,41 the Court held that these
provisions either exceeded Congress's authority under the commerce
and spending powers or infringed upon the sovereignty of the states
protected by the Tenth Amendment.42 While the Court declined to
reconsider its holding in Garcia,43 it nonetheless spoke of the Tenth
Amendment as a restriction on the federal government's enumerated
powers."
2. Schools of Thought
Before turning to the Court's decision in Lopez, two dominant
legal interpretations of the Court's jurisprudence in this area bear
38. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547-50.
39. Id. at 552-54.
40. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
41. Part of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1994
ed.), offered states the "choice" of regulating pursuant to congressional standards or "taking
title" to radioactive waste generated within their borders. New York, 505 U.S. at 174-75.
42. Id. at 177 ("Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside Congress's
enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government estab-
lished by the Constitution.").
43. Id. at 160 ("This case presents no occasion to apply or revisit the holdings of any of
these cases, as this is not a case in which Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation
applicable to private parties.").
44. Id. at 156-57.
[U]nder the Commerce Clause Congress may regulate publishers engaged in interstate
commerce, but Congress is constrained in the exercise of that power by the First
Amendment. The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this
limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have dis-
cussed, is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the
power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, re-
serve power to the States. The Tenth Amendment thus directs us to determine, as in
this case, whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an
Article I power.
Id. For a discussion of New York and an application of its holding, see Amy Marie Pepke, Note,
The Brady Bill: Surviving the Tenth Amendment, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 1803, 1817-21, 1828-31
(1995).
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mentioning: the "political process" theory and the "specifically dele-
gated" theory. The former view holds that the judiciary should not
decide controversies over the structure of federalism; instead, the
representation of the states in the political process will protect their
interests. Herbert Wechsler made this argument in the 1950s in an
attempt to explain the abrupt change in the New Deal Court,45 and
more recently Jesse Choper has forcefully articulated this view.46 The
Court explicitly adopted the political process view in Garcia,47 influ-
enced in part by these two scholars. 48 The underlying theory of the
"political process" doctrine is that courts have greater legitimacy
when deciding questions of individual rights than when determining
the boundaries of power between federal and state governments.
49
Courts should therefore devote their limited institutional capital 5 to
overruling the will of the political majority only when it conflicts with
an individual's protected right, rather than interfering when it con-
flicts with the power of another political body. From a practical per-
spective, this view also points out the failures of earlier judicial at-
tempts to police the federal/state boundary.51 These failures show the
futility of protecting state sovereignty in a nation where state
boundaries have little economic meaning.5 2 In fact, even the term
45. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 558-60
(1954).
46. Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional
Reconstruction of the Role of the Supreme Court (U. of Chicago, 1980). Professor Choper's thesis
is as follows:
The federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions respecting the ultimate
power of the national government vis-A-vis the states; rather, the constitutional issue of
whether federal action is beyond the authority of the central government and thus vio-
lates "states' rights" should be treated as nonjusticiable, final resolution being relegated
to the political branches-i.e., Congress and the President.
Id. at 175.
47. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556. This view was implied by the New Deal cases, since there
was a clear legislative mandate for congressional action to combat the Depression. See Part
II.A.I.
48. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 n.11 (citing Professors Choper and Wechsler).
49. Choper, Judicial Review at 201-03 (cited in note 46). "If the states concededly may do
to the individual what it is claimed that the federal government may not do, the issue of concern
is primarily one for the states and ... may be entrusted to the states' representatives in the
national political branches to decide." Id. at 196. If, however, it is claimed that neither gov-
ernment may act, the judicial branch must protect the individual's rights. Id.
50. See id. at 139-40.
51. Noting the Court's "dismal record of judicial intervention," Andrzej Rapaczynski has
commented that "[t]he most common explanation, seemingly adopted by the Garcia Court, is
that federalism is essentially a political arrangement and that the policing of it is, for one
reason or another, unsuited to the modus operandi of the judicial operation." From Sovereignty
to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 S. Ct. Rev. 341, 343.
52. Id. at 355.
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"state sovereignty" has no accepted definition and merely confuses the
issue in the federalism debate. 53 Under the process theory, the task of
the courts is to ensure the integrity of the political process, but
otherwise not to protect any notions of the sovereignty of states.54
Adherents to the specifically delegated powers viewpoint dis-
agree with the process approach because it ignores the principle of
limited government embodied in the Constitution.55 This view em-
phasizes that the states delegated certain powers to the federal gov-
ernment, while retaining for themselves extensive power over state
and local matters.56 This federal structure, our nation's unique con-
tribution to political thought, was designed to promote and protect
individual liberty.57 Transforming the Commerce Clause into a gen-
Within the American federal system, state boundaries have long lost most of their eco-
nomic significance, and as early as the distinction between commerce and production
appeared, the Court was forced to modify it by the introduction of the concept of the
"currenf' or "flow" of commerce and to draw another, economically irrelevant, distinction
between "direct" and "indirect" effects of the regulated activity on interstate commerce.
Id. (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 346.
When speaking of the states, therefore, the task is to articulate some independent
grounds for saying that some of their decisions are immune from federal interference,
and not to call the states "sovereign" in order to deduce anything from that. At the very
least, then, the idea of state sovereignty is of no help in elaborating a theory of federal-
ism.
Id. at 358-59.
54. Id. at 364.
55. See Epstein, 73 Va. L. Rev. at 1443 (cited in note 12). Professor Epstein writes:
The original theory of the Constitution was based on the belief that government was not
an unrequited good, but was at best a necessary evil. The system of enumerated powers
allowed state governments to compete among themselves, thus limiting the risks of gov-
ernmental abuse even absent explicit, substantive limitations on the laws that states
could pass. The various limitations upon the federal power helped achieve this end.
The New Deal conception, on the other hand, saw no virtue in competition, whether be-
tween states or between firms. The old barriers were stripped away; in their place has
emerged the vast and unwarranted concentration of power in Congress that remains the
hallmark of the modern regulatory state.
Id.
56. See U.S. Const., Amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
57. Federalist No. 51 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 320, 323
(Mentor, 1961). See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers"
In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752 (1995). Professor Calabresi argues
that federalism is "more important to the liberty and well being of the American people than
any other structural feature of our Constitution, including the separation of powers, the Bill of
Rights, and judicial review." Id. at 756. But see Choper, Judicial Review at 244 (cited in note
46) ("[The assertion that federalism was meant to protect, or does in fact protect, individual
constitutional freedoms akin to those conventionally so defined has no solid historical or logical
basis.").
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eral police power undermines federalism by increasing the jurisdic-
tion of the national government. 58
While process jurisprudence designates' the political process to
police the boundaries between state and federal power, the specifi-
cally delegated theory contends that it is precisely the role of the
federal courts to impose meaningful limits on Congress's commerce
power.59 The Supreme Court's institutional competence to decide
cases impacting the national/state balance of power can be seen in
dormant commerce clause cases, in Erie,60 and most recently in New
York v. United States.61 Returning to this role in the context of the
Commerce Clause is crucial to federalism and thereby to individual
liberty.
B. The Commerce Clause Today: United States v. Lopez
In United States v. Lopez,62 the Supreme Court struck down a
statute solely on the grounds that it exceeded Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause-the first time it had taken such a
stance in sixty years.63 The facts of Lopez are relatively straightfor-
ward. A twelfth grade student in San Antonio, Texas, was arrested
and charged under state law with possession of a firearm on school
premises. 4 On the following day, the state dropped its charges when
federal agents charged Lopez with violation of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act.65 The Act prohibited possession of a firearm within 1,000
feet of a school.66 The Court found that the Act "neither regulate[d] a
commercial activity nor contain[ed] a requirement that the possession
be connected in any way to interstate commerce," 67 and struck down
the Act as beyond the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause.68 An understanding of the Supreme Court's opinion in this
case is essential in assessing the future direction of commerce clause
jurisprudence.
58. Epstein, 73 Va. L. Rev. at 1395-96 (cited in note 12).
59. See Calabresi, 94 Mich. L. Rev. at 800-01 (cited in note 57).
60. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
61. Calabresi, 94 Mich. L. Rev. at 801 (cited in note 57).
62. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995).
63. The last case to invalidate a congressional statute under the Commerce Clause was
Carter Coal in 1936. See note 11.
64. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
65. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994 ed.).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A).
67. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
68. Id. at 1634.
1997]
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1. The Majority
The Court began its analysis by recounting the history of con-
gressional power under the Commerce Clause.69 From this survey,
the Court deduced three categories of activity that Congress may
regulate: (1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce;"7 (2)
"the instrumentalities of interstate commerce;"71 and (3) "those activi-
ties having a substantial relation to interstate commerce."72  After
concluding that the act did not fall under the first two categories of
regulation,73 the Court turned to the final category.
The Court offered two types of regulation that would substan-
tially affect interstate commerce: (1) regulation of an economic activ-
ity substantially affecting interstate commerce; 74 and (2) regulation
including a jurisdictional element requiring that the particular activ-
ity be connected to interstate commerce. 75 The Court first concluded
that the activity regulated by the act was not an economic activity.
7 6
The Court distinguished the expansive holding of Wickard on the
grounds that the growing of wheat involved an economic activity,
whereas possession of a firearm within a school zone is neither a
commercial activity nor any kind of economic enterprise. 77 Also, un-
like the regulation at issue in Wickard, the Gun-Free School Zones
Act did not regulate an intrastate activity as a part of a larger inter-
state economic regulation.71 Considering the second permissible type
of regulation, the Court noted that the Act did not contain a jurisdic-
tional requirement making the connection between firearm possession
69. First, though, Chief Justice Rehnquist extolled the importance of enumerated powers
within the federal structure. He noted:
This constitutionally mandated division of authority "was adopted by the Framers to en-
sure [the] protection of our fundamental liberties." "Just as the separation and inde-
pendence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve[s] to prevent the
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between
the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from
either front."
Id. at 1626 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
70. Id. at 1629. Examples include regulation of navigation, see Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-
90, and regulation of the shipment of stolen goods, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-15 (1994 ed.).
71. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629. The Court cited examples such as the regulation of rail-
ways, The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351 (discussed in note 10), and aircraft, 18 U.S.C. §
32. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
72. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
73. Id. at 1630.
74. Id. The Court cited Perez, McClung, Heart of Atlanta Motel, and Wickard approvingly
under this category. Id.
75. Id. at 1631.
76. Id. at 1630-31.
77. Id. at 1630.
78. Id. at 1631.
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and interstate commerce an essential element of the crime.7 9 Without
such a nexus requirement, the statute merely prohibited intrastate
possession of a firearm and thus did not impact interstate commerce.
Having seemingly disposed of both categories under which the
regulated activity could have substantially affected interstate com-
merce, the Court proceeded to consider the government's arguments
that this noneconomic activity substantially affected interstate com-
merce.80 The government argued that gun possession in a school zone
could result in violence, and that such violence could impact the na-
tional economy in two ways. First, the substantial costs of violent
crimes are spread throughout the nation through insurance, and vio-
lent crimes may discourage travel to afflicted areas.81 Second, the
presence of guns in schools could substantially threaten the learning
environment, resulting in less educated citizens.82 This would in turn
adversely affect the national economy through decreased worker
productivity.
8 3
Recognizing that this logic implied that no perceptible limits
existed on the commerce power, the Court rejected the government's
arguments. 84 First, the Court noted that the government's position
would convert the Commerce Clause into a grant of general federal
police power.85 This conflicted with the Court's understanding that
criminal law enforcement and education have historically been areas
over which the states have exercised sovereignty.86 Both the local
nature and the noneconomic nature of the activity persuaded the
Court that this Act was beyond the scope of the Constitution.8 7 The
Court acknowledged that Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause was broad, but nevertheless insisted that that power did not
79. Id. A jurisdictional element "would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the
firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce." Id.
80. "The Government's essential contention, in fine, is that we may determine here that §
922(q) is valid because possession of a firearm in a local school zone does indeed substantially
affect interstate commerce." Id. at 1632.
While the Court noted that the statute contained no congressional findings linking the
possession of a firearm within a school zone to interstate commerce, it found no requirement of
express findings. Id. at 1631.
81. Id. at 1632 (citing United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 253).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. "[I]f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit
any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate." Id.
85. Id. at 1634.
86. Id. at 1632.
87. Id. at 1634. 'The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic




include the authority to regulate the possession of firearms in local
schools.
2. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy, joining the Court's "necessary though limited
holding,"88 emphasized the protection of the system of federalism. He
first noted that the Court's role in determining the limits of the com-
merce power was essential to preserving the delicate balance of feder-
alism.89 He then echoed Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion,
finding that the statute did not regulate an economic activity.90 He
noted that neither the act of carrying a firearm within 1,000 feet of a
school nor the design of the statute itself has any commercial charac-
ter.91 Given this unprecedented stretch of the Commerce Clause to
govern non-economic activity, Justice Kennedy then framed the nec-
essary inquiry as whether the federal power intruded upon a matter
of "traditional state concern."92  He concluded that education was
within the realm of traditional state authority, and that federal legis-
lation in this area prevented the states from exercising that authority
according to their own judgment of local needs.
9 3
3. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer's dissent 94 argued that the act was within the
scope of the Commerce Clause as defined by the Court over the past
fifty years.9 5 Justice Breyer began by identifying three touchstones of
commerce clause jurisprudence. First, Congress may regulate local
activities that "significantly affect interstate commerce. ' 6 Second, as
88. Id. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 1639-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring). "[Tihe federal balance is too essential a part
of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit
inability to intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far."
Id. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, thus
rejected process jurisprudence. See Part II.A.2.
90. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also provided a concurring
opinion in which he urged the Court to bring commerce clause jurisprudence back to accordance
with the original understanding of the Constitution. Id. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
94. Joining Justice Breyer were Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. at 1657.
Justices Stevens and Souter also filed separate dissents. Id. at 1651.
95. Id. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer used "significant" to underscore the fact
that the commerce power is not as limited as the requirement of a substantial effect might
[Vol. 50:239252
Wickard demands, a court must consider not the impact of an indi-
vidual act but rather the aggregate effect of all similar acts.97 Third, a
court must not evaluate the connection between the activity and
commerce directly but at "one remove."98 That is, it must decide only
whether Congress had a rational basis99 for concluding that the activ-
ity affected interstate commerce. 100
Justice Breyer concluded that Congress could rationally have
found that violence in schools substantially affects interstate com-
merce. First, he reasoned that Congress could have decided that the
national problem of violence in schools threatens the quality of educa-
tion in our school systems. 0' Second, he noted the relationship be-
tween quality education and commerce: particularly in today's global
marketplace, good schools are essential in producing a competent
workforce. 0 2  Accordingly, he reasoned, poor educational systems
threaten the commercial life of the nation. Justice Breyer concluded
that, given the severity of the problem of violence in schools and its
corresponding impact on the quality of education, along with the
commercial effects which result from lower quality schools, Congress
could reasonably have found that violent crime in school zones sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce. 0 3
Justice Breyer criticized the majority opinion on several points.
He first contended that the decision deviated from fifty years of com-
merce clause jurisprudence.104 He argued that the connection to in-
terstate commerce was more substantial here than in several previous
cases. 0 5 Second, Justice Breyer charged the majority with mischarac-
terizing the analysis of past cases by introducing a formalistic com-
merciallnoncommercial distinction in determining whether federal
authority may intrude into local realms.06 He contended that these
cases did not require that the regulated activity be economic in na-
ture; rather, they required only that the activity affect interstate
suggest. Nevertheless, he observed that this semantic difference would not have changed the
outcome of this case. Id. at 1657-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
99. Some commentators have termed the majority's test a heightened rational basis stan-
dard. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 674, 682-84 (1995).
100. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1659-60 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1661 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1662 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer argued that the congressional
actions at issue in Perez, McClung, and Wickard had a more tenuous connection to interstate
commerce than did the statute in the case at bar. Id. at 1662-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1663 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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commerce. 07 Finally, he asserted that the majority's decision would
generate legal uncertainty in this area of jurisprudence.
10 8
III. THE FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC ENTRANCES ACT OF 1994
Congress enacted the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act0 9 on May 26, 1994, in response to increasingly violent anti-abor-
tion protests at reproductive health centers throughout the country.
10
The FACE Act, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez, is a
federal criminal statute passed under the commerce power.", The
statute applies to persons ranging from nonviolent demonstrators who
obstruct clinic entrances to violent protesters, some of whom have
murdered reproductive health employees.12  The FACE Act is inher-
ently suspect because it contains no jurisdictional element linking the
regulated activity to interstate commerce.
A. The Statute and Its Background
1. The Text
Subsection (a) of the statute describes the prohibited activity.
To fall within the statute a person must intentionally use force, the
threat of force, or physical obstruction to injure, intimidate, or inter-
fere with a person to prevent that person from obtaining reproductive
health services."3 Additionally, a person who intentionally damages
107. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109. Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (1994), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994 ed.).
110. See Part III.A.2.a.
111. See Pub. L. No. 103-259, § 2, 108 Stat. 694 (1994) (stating that Congress has the
"affirmative power ... to enact this legislation under section 8 of article I of the Constitution, as
well as under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution...").
Congress has often used the commerce power to pass criminal statutes. For example,
federal statutes prohibit firearm possession, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994 ed.) (prohibiting a con-
victed felon to "possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition"); arson, 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(i) (1994 ed.) ("Whoever maliciously damages or destroys .... by means of fire or an explo-
sive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign
commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned. .. .");
and carjacking, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994 ed.) (prohibiting the taking of a "motor vehicle that has
been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce . .. by force and
violence or by intimidation").
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 248 (a)(1).
113. Subsection (a), in relevant part, reads as follows:
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the property of a reproductive health provider may be prosecuted
under the statute.1 4 Noticeably absent from subsection (a) is a juris-
dictional element requiring a link between the regulated activity and
interstate commerce. Subsection (b) outlines the penalties for viola-
tions of the statute. A first-time offender may be fined, imprisoned
for up to one year, or both." 5 For each subsequent conviction, an of-
fender may be fined or imprisoned up to three years." 6 The fines for
nonviolent offenders are specifically listed-up to $10,000 and six
months imprisonment for the first violation, and up to $25,000 and
eighteen months imprisonment for each subsequent violation."
7
Section (c) provides a right of civil action for aggrieved persons, for
the U.S. Attorney General, and for state attorneys general." s Civil
remedies for individuals include compensatory damages, punitive
damages, injunctive relief, reasonable costs, and attorney's fees." 9 In
addition, an individual may elect to receive a $5,000 statutory penalty
Whoever-
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, in-
timidates, or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any
person because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or
any other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive
health services ...
shall be subject to the penalties provided in subsection (b) and the civil remedies pro-
vided in subsection (c), except that a parent or legal guardian of a minor shall not be
subject to any penaltieg or civil remedies under this section for such activities insofar as
they are directed exclusively at that minor.
Id.
The act defines reproductive health services as "services provided in a hospital, clinic, phy-
sician's office, or other facility, and includes medical, surgical, counseling or referral services
relating to the human reproductive system, including services relating to pregnancy or the
termination of a pregnancy." Id. § 248(e)(5).
114. Id. § 248(a)(3) (applying the penalties to whoever "intentionally damages or destroys
the property of a facility, or attempts to do so, because such facility provides reproductive health
services").
115. Id. § 248(b)(1) (providing that those who violate this provision shall, "in the case of a
first offense, be fined in accordance with this title, or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both").
116. Id. § 248(b)(2) (providing that "in the case of a second or subsequent offense after a
prior conviction under this section, [the offender shall] be fined in accordance with this title, or
imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both").
117. Section 248(b) adds the following exceptions for nonviolent offenses:
[E]xcept that for an offense involving exclusively a nonviolent physical obstruction, the
fine shall be not more than $10,000 and the length of imprisonment shall be not more
than six months, or both, for the first offense; and the fine shall.., be not more than
$25,000 and the length of imprisonment shall be not more than 18 months, or both, for a
subsequent offense ....
Id. § 248(b). The statute further provides "that if bodily injury results, the length of imprison-
ment shall be not more than 10 years, and if death results, it shall be for any term of years or
for life." Id.
118. Id. § 248(c).
119. Id.
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instead of compensatory damages.120  In an action by the United
States Attorney General or a state attorney general, the court may
award injunctive relief, compensatory damages, a civil penalty, or




The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources provides a detailed account of the legislative history of the
FACE Act. 22 Generally, Congress perceived that organized anti-abor-
tion groups had restricted access to reproductive health clinics, fre-
quently through intimidation and violence, and that this national
problem required a federal remedy.
23
a. Events Leading to the FACE Act
The Senate Report cited the increasing violence accompanying
the anti-abortion movement as a major impetus for the enactment of
the statute.124 The Senate Report observed that between 1977 and
April 1993, anti-abortion protesters committed over 1,000 acts of vio-
lence against abortion providers, including bombings, arsons, death
threats, assaults, kidnappings, and murders. 125 The murder of Dr.
David Gunn in Pensacola, Florida, on March 10, 1993, was a recent
memory at the time the Committee voted to recommend the statute.
1 26
In addition, anti-abortion protesters had organized over 6,000 clinic
entrance blockades since 1977.127 The Senate Committee found that
these blockades had disrupted health services, terrorized patients and
staff, and imposed costs of millions of dollars on the criminal justice
system, the clinics themselves, and society in general.
28
120. Id. § 248(c)(1)(B).
121. Id. § 248(c)(2)(B), (c)(3)(B).
122. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, S. Rep. No. 103-117, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) ("Senate Report').
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id.
125. Id. ("These acts included at least 36 bombings, 81 arsons, 131 death threats, 84 as-
saults, two kidnappings, 327 clinic invasions, and one murder.") (citing a report from the
National Abortion Federation).
126. See William Booth, Doctor Killed During Abortion Protest: Alleged Gunman Calmly
Surrenders to Police Outside Florida Clinic, Wash. Post Al (March 11, 1993). The Committee
approved the FACE Act on June 23, 1993. Senate Report at 33-35 (cited in note 122).
127. Senate Report at 7 (cited in note 122) (citing a report from the National Abortion
Federation).
128. Id. (citing a report from the National Abortion Federation).
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b. The Need for the FACE Act
The Senate Committee found that the anti-abortion groups
expressly intended to use threatening activity to eliminate access to
abortion clinics.129 The groups hoped that mass disregard of the law
would overwhelm the judicial system, rendering efforts to enjoin such
activities futile. 130  The Senate Committee noted Attorney General
Janet Reno's testimony that the problem was national in scope, and
that the activities were frequently organized and conducted across
state borders.' 31 It was not uncommon, testimony showed, for anti-
abortion leaders 32 in one state to order the blockade of a particular
clinic in another. The Senate concluded that such national activity is
impossible for states to enjoin, as their jurisdiction ends at the state
line. 13
In addition, the Senate Committee found existing federal,
state, and local law to be inadequate to meet the challenge posed by
the anti-abortion activities.134  The Supreme Court in Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic135 denied the possibility of injunc-
tive relief under 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3), which prohibits conspira-
cies intended to deprive a person or class of persons of their civil
rights.136 In Bray, the Court found protesters' opposition to abortion
not to constitute a discriminatory motive comparable to racial dis-
crimination. 37 The Court also held the provision inapplicable because
the protesters had not infringed upon a right that was protected
against private action. 38 It rejected arguments asserting a constitu-
tional right to be free from individual interference with access to
abortions.' 39
129. Id. at 11.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 12-13.
132. The Senate Report mentions Operation Rescue, among other organizations. Id. at 13-
14.
133. Id. at 13.
134. Id. at 10.
135. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
136. Id. at 267-68.
137. Id. at 268-69.
138. Id. at 274. The Court also found that the purpose of the protesters' conspiracy was not
to infringe women's right of interstate travel; at most this was incidental to their efforts. Id. at
275-76. The Court was also troubled by the fact that to hold that anti-abortion demonstrations
violated the right of interstate travel would transform all state-law torts into civil rights actions
if committed against interstate travelers. Id. at 276-77.
139. Id. at 277-78. Section 1985(3) does not give individuals a cause of action to sue other
private individuals for intrusions on a right protected only against state action. Id.
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The Senate Committee found state and local laws proscribing
trespass, vandalism, and assault to be insufficient to deal with na-
tional problems. First, it concluded that some local officials had re-
fused to apply the law to anti-abortion demonstrators because of sym-
pathy to their political viewpoint.140 Second, it noted that when offi-
cials had attempted to enforce the law, the national scope of the pro-
testers' organizations often hampered their efforts.141 Third, local
officials had frequently been overwhelmed by the number of protest-
ers. They did not have sufficient law enforcement personnel to arrest
hundreds of demonstrators.12 Finally, the Committee noted the pen-
alties available under the state and local laws at issue here were too
small to offer adequate deterrence for repeated violations.'43
c. Constitutional Authority for the FACE Act
Congress enacted the FACE Act under the authority of the
Commerce Clause and section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.14
The Senate Committee made detailed findings regarding the effect of
the activity regulated by the FACE Act on interstate commerce, in-
cluding the opinions of Attorney General Janet Reno and Professor
Laurence Tribe that Congress possessed authority to implement the
Act. 145
The Senate Committee made several findings concerning in-
terstate commerce. First, it found abortion clinics to be engaged in
interstate commerce. The Committee reasoned that the clinics were
directly involved in interstate commerce because they purchased
medical supplies from other states, and indirectly involved because
they employed workers, paid rent, and in general operated as a busi-
ness-they were "within the stream of interstate commerce."14G
Second, it found that both patients and clinic employees frequently
140. Senate Report at 19 (cited in note 122) (citing the testimony of a Texas sheriff before a
House subcommittee).
141. Id. at 19-20. "Mr. Lasso, City Manager of Falls Church, VA, explained, for example,
that because the blockades against clinics in his jurisdiction were planned outside of Virginia,
the perpetrators were to a large degree beyond the reach of Virginia law and Virginia State
court injunctions." Id. at 20.
142. Id. at 20 (citing testimony that it took all thirty of Falls Church's police officers several
hours to make over two hundred arrests in response to a 1988 blockade).
143. Id. After being charged fines similar to those imposed for speeding violations, protest-
ers frequently returned to the blockaded clinics. Even repeat offenders were not jailed. Id. at
20-21.
144. Id. at 30-33. For a discussion of the authority for the act under the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Part V.
145. Senate Report at 30 (cited in note 122).
146. Id. at 31.
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traveled interstate to the clinics.147  Finally, the Senate Committee
reported that the activities regulated by the FACE Act had a negative
impact on interstate commerce; such intimidation discouraged the
movement of people and goods in interstate commerce.
148
B. Legal Challenges to the Statute
Legal challenges to the FACE Act have focused primarily on
freedom of speech concerns, 49 but each of the cases has also raised a
commerce clause challenge to the statute. 50 One district court ruled
the FACE Act unconstitutional under the theory that Congress ex-
ceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 5' On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, however, a divided
panel overturned this decision. 52  The Seventh Circuit opinion pro-
vides a useful device for exploring the arguments for and against
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause in the context of
the FACE Act.
The facts of United States v. Wilson 53 were not contested.
There, under the FACE Act, local officials prosecuted six Wisconsin
residents 54 for blockading the front and rear entrances of an abortion
clinic in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 55 The defendants wedged automo-
biles into the entrances and welded themselves into the vehicles using
steel restraining devices. 5 6 It took local firefighters over four hours to
147. Id. The Committee noted that the Supreme Court in Bray had accepted the finding
that "substantial numbers of women travel interstate to seek abortion services." Id. (citing
Bray, 506 U.S. at 275).
148. Id. at 31-32. The Committee compared the effect to that caused by racial discrimina-
tion in hotels and restaurants. Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 241).
149. See, for example, American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 648-54 (4th Cir.
1995) (holding the FACE Act not to violate the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 55, 133 L. Ed. 2d 19 (1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1521-22. (11th Cir.
1995) (same); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 921-24 (8th Cir. 1996) (same).
150. See, for example, American Life League, 47 F.3d at 647; Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1519-21;
Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 919-21.
151. United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 623 (E.D. Wis. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Skott v. United States, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 4624 (1996). One year after
Wilson was decided at the trial level, another district court agreed that the FACE Act exceeded
Congress's power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791
(W.D.N.C. 1996). Oddly, the court made no mention of its own circuit's contrary authority. See
923 F. Supp. at 814 (disagreeing with the Eleventh Circuit in Cheffer and the Seventh Circuit in
Wilson, but failing to acknowledge American Life League).
152. United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Skott v. United
States, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 4624.
153. 880 F. Supp. 621, 623 (E.D. Wis. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
Skott v. United States, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 4624.
154. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 690 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 677.
156. Id.
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remove the defendants and the obstructing automobiles, during which
time neither staff members of the clinic nor patients could enter the
building. 57  Defendants were charged with violations of the FACE
Act. The district court dismissed the charges, holding that the statute
was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. 158
To begin its lengthy analysis of the commerce clause challenge,
the district court first addressed the rational basis test. It concluded
that the test must not allow congressional regulation of each and
every activity that Congress could plausibly find affected interstate
commerce. 59 Rather, the test must take into account the limits of the
commerce power. 160 The court then considered whether the regulated
activity affected interstate commerce. It derived three guiding princi-
ples from Supreme Court precedent:' (1) When a general regulatory
scheme has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, Congress
may regulate "trivial" conduct falling under the scheme;161 (2)
Congress may regulate commercial establishments receiving goods in
interstate commerce; 62 and (3) Congress may regulate "activities that
employ violent means to achieve an economic purpose."163
The court concluded that the activity regulated under the
FACE Act did not fall into any of the three categories. First, the Act
did not establish a national commercial regulatory scheme, and par-
ticular acts of protest do not in the aggregate undermine such a com-
mercial scheme.164 Second, unlike Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
which regulates commercial establishments, the FACE Act regulates
157. Id.
158. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 634. The court specifically held unconstitutional "that portion
of 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) which applies to non-violent physical obstruction of reproductive health
services clinics." Id. The court also concluded that section five of the Fourteenth Amendment
did not give Congress authority for the FACE Act. Id. at 634-36. The district cdurt issued its
opinion the month before the Supreme Court announced its decision in Lopez.
159. Id. at 625-26. The court noted that Congress could plausibly find any activity to affect
interstate commerce: "[In a logical sense, all activity 'affects' commerce because 'there is no
private activity, no matter how local and insignificant, the ripple [e]ffect from which is not in
some theoretical measure ultimately felt beyond the borders of the state in which it took
place.'" Id. at 625 (quoting Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1362 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S. Ct. at 1624).
160. Id. at 626. The court found two limits on the commerce power: First, Congress cannot
violate a provision of the Constitution such as the First Amendment; second, it "cannot interpret
and exercise any one of its enumerated powers so expansively that it effectively subsumes other
enumerated powers or those powers reserved to the States, or extends to all spheres of human
activity." Id.
161. Id. at 627. Examples of this category include the regulations sustained in Wickard
and Perez. Id.
162. Id. at 628. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was upheld by Heart of
Atlanta Motel and McClung, illustrates this category. Id.
163. Id. at 629. The regulation of organized crime is an example of this category. Id.
164. Id. at 628.
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private activities. 16 5 Also, the obstruction of access to reproductive
health services did not infringe upon the right to interstate travel.166
Finally, the particular activity regulated in Wilson did not employ
violent means to achieve an economic purpose; indeed, it employed
nonviolent means to further a noneconomic purpose.
167
1. Majority View
The Seventh Circuit followed the lead of the Fourth 68 and
Eleventh' 69 Circuits in overturning the district court's opinion and
sustaining the FACE Act. 70  The court concluded that the activities
165. Id.
166. Id. at 628-29.
167. Id. at 629. In addition, the court specifically addressed the congressional findings
supporting the FACE Act. It dismissed the finding that abortion clinics operate within the
stream of commerce because under such logic, no activity could escape regulation under the
commerce power. Id. at 630. Next, it concluded that if Congress could regulate abortion clinics
because some providers and patients travel across state lines to reach the clinic, Congress could
also regulate golfing, camping, and shopping. Id. at 630-31. Furthermore, it lambasted the
contention that Congress could regulate "any human activity which arguably decreases the sale
or purchase of specific goods or services," id. at 631, offering the examples of shoplifting and
breastfeeding as potential targets, id. at 631 n.17. Last, the court found irrelevant Congress's
conclusion that the problem was national in scope. That alone was not enough unless the
activity affected interstate commerce. Id. at 631. Even if anti-abortion activity affected inter-
state commerce, the court doubted it was a problem the states could not control, as no findings
indicated that states utilized 42 U.S.C. § 10501's provision for federal assistance in such circum-
stances. Id. at 631-32.
168. In American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 55, 133 L. Ed. 2d 19 (1995), an action filed on the same day the FACE Act became law, the
Fourth Circuit held that the statute was within Congress's commerce power, that it did not
violate the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause, and that it did not violate the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 645. In briefly considering the commerce clause
challenge to the act, the court found that Congress rationally concluded that violence, threats,
and physical obstructions of reproductive health services affected interstate commerce. Id. at
647. It concluded that the regulatory means chosen were "reasonably adapted to permissible
ends." Id. The court then considered at length the first amendment challenges to the Act. Id.
at 648-56. Because the Fourth Circuit decided American Life League two months before the
Supreme Court's Lopez decision, American Life League's analysis of the commerce clause issue
is not especially helpful.
169. In an opinion issued less than two months after Lopez, the Eleventh Circuit upheld
the FACE Act against several challenges in Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995). In
answer to a tenth amendment challenge, the court held that the act was permissible under the
commerce power and thus did not violate the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 1521. The court distin-
guished Lopez on the grounds that, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the FACE Act did
regulate commercial activity, "the provision of reproductive health services." Id. at 1520. Also,
the court was persuaded by extensive congressional findings that the regulated activity had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 1520-21. The court proceeded to hold that the
Act survived first amendment challenges under the Free Speech Clause, id. at 1521-22, and the
Free Exercise Clause, id. at 1522, and that the eighth amendment challenge was not ripe for
review, id. at 1523-24.
170. United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995). After the Seventh Circuit decided
Wilson, the Eighth Circuit upheld the FACE Act as well. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 913.
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regulated under the statute substantially affected interstate com-
merce and that the statute was therefore within Congress's commerce
power. 171 The court considered congressional findings that reproduc-
tive health facilities substantially relate to interstate commerce, and
ruled that a rational basis existed for such findings. First, it accepted
Congress's finding that these health clinics operate within the stream
of commerce, rebuking the district court for converting the rational
basis test to a less deferential standard.172 Second, the court found
that Congress could rationally have concluded that the interstate
travel of individuals seeking reproductive health services was sub-
stantial, and thus that the obstruction of these individuals substan-
tially affected interstate commerce. 173 The court cited evidence that
the decreasing number of reproductive health clinics had resulted in
greater percentages of patients traveling across state lines to obtain
abortions. 174 Third, the court approved Congress's finding that the
diminished opportunity to access abortion clinics posed a substantial
threat to interstate commerce. 75
The Seventh Circuit distinguished Lopez on several grounds.
First, the court found that, unlike the statute in Lopez, the FACE
Act's regulation of reproductive health services governed a commer-
cial enterprise. 176 Second, it noted that while congressional findings
regarding links to interstate commerce are not determinative, the
extensive findings in the FACE Act stood in contrast to the absence of
such findings in the Gun-Free School Zones Act of Lopez.' 77 The court
rejected the argument that the FACE Act regulated noncommercial
activity. Instead, it ruled that Congress may regulate any private
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. 78 In short,
the court interpreted Lopez as a continuation of existing commerce
clause cases, reaffirming the expansive jurisprudence of the past sixty
years.
171. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 679-80.
172. Id. at 680-81.
173. Id. at 681.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 682. While these reasons were sufficient to establish congressional authority,
the court rejected as irrelevant findings that the problem was national in scope. Id. at 683.
Instead, the court determined that whether an activity is national or local, if it substantially
affects interstate commerce it may be regulated under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 682-83.
176. Id. at 683-84 (citing Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520-21).





The dissent in Wilson, on the other hand, viewed Lopez as a
fundamental shift in commerce clause jurisprudence, calling for a
limitation of the substantial effects analysis to two situations: when a
federal criminal statute contains a jurisdictional element requiring
that the prohibited conduct substantially affect interstate commerce
and when the regulation of economic activity substantially affects
interstate commerce. 79 Judge Coffey concluded that since the FACE
Act was drafted without the requisite jurisdictional element and did
not regulate economic activity substantially affecting interstate com-
merce, the statute was unconstitutional.180
The dissent rejected the majority's conclusion that Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause is not limited to the regulation
of commercial entities.8 1 Judge Coffey instead pointed out that all of
the cases Lopez cited as illustrative of activity substantially affecting
interstate commerce regulated some kind of economic activity. 18 2 For
instance, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 regulated hotels and restau-
rants-economic actors engaged in racial discrimination.183 In con-
trast, the FACE Act regulated private individuals engaged in protest.
While the majority's language focused on the commercial nature of
the reproductive health clinics, the dissent argued that the statute
focused on the protesters, not the clinics.184 The result was a federal
statute regulating noneconomic abortion protests.
The dissent argued that due to the absence of a jurisdictional
element in the FACE Act linking the protest to interstate commerce,
the statute allowed the conviction of Wisconsin residents for actions
in Wisconsin. 8 5 The dissent concluded that the statute thus allowed
the federalization of a local trespass.'8 6  Such power under the
Commerce Clause disrupts the delicate balance between federal and
state governments.
8 7
179. Id. at 691 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630, 1631).
180. Id. at 690 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 693 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
182. Id. (Coffey, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 692 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (Coffey, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 690 (Coffey, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that the record did not show
whether any of the clinic staff members traveled in interstate commerce or whether any of their
supplies were obtained in interstate commerce. Id. (Coffey, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 699 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Coffey, J., dissenting).
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IV. THE FACE ACT UNDER LOPEZ
The difference between the majority opinion and the dissent in
Wilson illustrates the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's position in
Lopez. If Lopez limits the substantial effects category to (1) regula-
tion of those commercial activities which substantially affect inter-
state commerce, and (2) regulation of noncommercial activities that
are shown, through case-by-case application of a jurisdictional ele-
ment, substantially to affect interstate commerce, 188 then the FACE
Act should be overturned. If, however, Lopez also allows the use of
the second type of regulation without a jurisdictional element, 89 then
the Act could be upheld.
A. Evaluating the Majority Approach
The majority's argument that the FACE Act regulates a com-
mercial activity is plausible. Though the statute refers only to the
conduct of protesters, in essence it is regulating access to commercial
reproductive health facilities. Congress made extensive findings that
these facilities operate within the stream of interstate commerce, and
a court could rationally conclude that ensuring access to these com-
mercial entities is within Congress's commerce power. 190 Still, the
minority's argument that the statute regulates the conduct of non-
commercial private protesters seems more true to the wording of the
FACE Act.19
Lopez requires that the statute either regulate a commercial
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce or contain a
jurisdictional element providing a nexus between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce. 192 The FACE Act, like the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, does not contain a jurisdictional element making
the connection of the regulated activity to interstate commerce an
element of the crime.
The majority's strongest argument is that even if the FACE
Act regulates the noncommercial protesters instead of the commercial
health care facilities, these protest activities nonetheless have a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority has authority for
this position because the Lopez Court addressed the argument that
188. See Lopez, 116 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
189. See id. at 1632-33.
190. See Part III.A.2.c.
191. See discussion at Part IV.B.
192. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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noneconomic gun possession affected interstate commerce before
ultimately rejecting it as too remote. 193 Here, the protesters' actions
arguably burden commercial enterprises that receive supplies, work-
ers, and even patients from across state lines. 9 4 Thus, even local
protests substantially affect the interstate commerce in which the
reproductive clinics are engaged.
FACE Act advocates could cite Wickard, McClung, and Perez
as support for such an argument. Wickard upheld the regulation of
local wheat production because in the aggregate local production had
a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 195 McClung sustained the
regulation of racial discrimination in local restaurants because that
discrimination had an adverse effect on interstate commerce. 96 Perez
continued this notion that Congress may regulate a class of activities
if the total impact of the collective acts affects interstate commerce, 97
holding that even local loan-sharking activities may affect interstate
commerce. 198 Wickard and McClung explicitly state that the regulated
act need not be commercial to affect interstate commerce, 99 and the
Lopez Court did not question these decisions.2° Therefore, the major-
ity approach has strong authority for the proposition that local non-
commercial abortion protests may have a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce.
As a practical matter, the majority view's argument to limit
Lopez to its facts has some merit. The statute in Lopez regulated a
noncommercial activity, did not require a nexus to interstate com-
merce as an element to the crime, lacked specific congressional
findings, and regulated education, which is traditionally a state con-
cern.20' The FACE Act, in turn, is similar to the Gun-Free School
Zones Act only in its lack of a nexus requirement as an element of the
crime. It differs in several ways. The FACE Act arguably regulates
193. See Part II.B.3.
194. See Part III.A.2.
195. 317 U.S. at 128-29.
196. 379 U.S. at 304.
197. 402 U.S. at 154.
198. Id.
199. McClung, 379 U.S. at 383 ("[B]ut 'even if appellee's activity be local and though it may
not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce ... ') (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S.
at 125).
200. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring) C[Wickard, Heart of Atlanta
Motel, McClung, Perez,] and like authorities are within the fair ambit of the Court's practical
conception of commercial regulation and are not called in question by our decision today.").
201. See Merritt, 94 Mich. L. Rev. at 693-700 (cited in note 99) (discussing factors limiting
the future application of Lopez).
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commercial reproductive health facilities. 2 2 The Act also contains
extensive congressional findings linking the effects of anti-abortion
protests to interstate commerce. 203 Furthermore, the regulation of
reproductive health facilities does not raise quite the level of concern
of federal intrusion on state power as does the regulation of local
schools, an area at the heart of state and local concern. 204 Thus, advo-
cates may argue that facts unique to Lopez compelled the Court to
overturn the Gun-Free School Zones Act.
B. Evaluating the Minority Approach
Despite the strength of the majority's arguments and its wide-
spread acceptance, the minority view provides the more realistic
approach. The minority approach forcefully contends that the FACE
Act is unconstitutional under Lopez because the statute neither regu-
lates commercial activity nor contains a jurisdictional element. 205
Upholding the FACE Act would require an extension of existing com-
merce clause jurisprudence that the Lopez Court was unwilling to
approve.206
The minority's argument that the FACE Act regulates non-
commercial protesters instead of commercial reproductive health care
facilities more accurately describes the wording of the statute than
the majority's approach. A comparison to the regulation in Lopez is
appropriate. There, the Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones
Act, which prohibited gun possession in school zones, was neither an
economic regulation nor an essential part of the regulation of eco-
nomic activity.20 7 Under this analysis, the FACE Act, which prohibits
the physical obstruction, intimidation, or injury of those seeking to
access or provide reproductive services, 208 is not an economic regula-
tion. Instead, it criminalizes specified acts by protesters.
Case law provides no precedent for regulating noncommercial
activity without requiring a nexus to interstate commerce on a case-
202. See notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
203. See Part III.A.2.
204. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting that, in the circum-
stances surrounding the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Court has "a particular duty to insure
that the federal-state balance is not destroyed").
205. See Part III.B.2.
206. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 ("The broad language in [prior commerce clause cases]
has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any fur-
ther.").
207. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
208. See Part III.A.1.
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by-case basis.0 9 Despite the majority's attempt to characterize the
post-New Deal commerce clause cases as providing authority for the
regulation of noncommercial activity substantially affecting interstate
commerce, close examination of these cases proves otherwise.
Wickard upheld a national economic regulation that controlled wheat
prices.210 Even if one concedes that Wickard did not involve a com-
mercial farmer, the regulation at issue was a commercial one. 2
11
Similarly, the regulation in Perez criminalized an extortionate com-
mercial transaction.212 The FACE Act, on the other hand, regulates
noncommercial acts of obstruction or intimidation. The difference is
perhaps best seen by comparing the FACE Act to the statute at issue
in McClung and Heart of Atlanta Motel. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibited hotels and restaurants-commercial establishments-from
discriminatings13 These cases would only provide authority for the
constitutionality of the FACE Act if they upheld legislation prohibit-
ing civil rights demonstrators from obstructing the entrances to these
commercial establishments. Sustaining the FACE Act, then, requires
extending commerce clause jurisprudence one step further to allow
the regulation of noneconomic activity that affects interstate com-
merce.
Under Lopez, such regulation of noneconomic activity affecting
interstate commerce is only permissible if the statute contains a ju-
risdictional element linking the noneconomic activity to interstate
commerce on a case-by-case inquiry.214 The absence of a nexus re-
quirement in the FACE Act could potentially allow local, noncom-
mercial protesters to be convicted of a federal crimes without any
showing of a connection to interstate commerce. 21
5
Even if Lopez did allow the regulation of noncommercial activ-
ity substantially affecting interstate commerce without a jurisdic-
tional element, the minority view that the FACE Act is unconstitu-
tional would still be superior. The majority approach faces a thresh-
old barrier in the substantiality requirement: protest activities must
209. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 693 (Coffey, J., dissenting) ("Where Congress is not regulating
economic activity, insisting on jurisdictional language in a federal criminal statute is essential
because, 'under our federal system, the "States possess primary authority for defining and
enforcing the criminal law."' ") (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 n.3).
210. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
211. See notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
212. See note 29 and accompanying text.
213. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
214. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 692-94 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
215. Id. (Coffey, J., dissenting).
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place a substantial burden on interstate commerce. 216 Abortion pro-
testes' impact on interstate commerce does not seem to rise to the
level of that caused by denying food and lodging to African-American
travelers217 or providing income for organized crime.218  The Court
could find that the FACE Act fails the substantial effects test. Such a
finding, however, would be open to criticism on grounds that the
Court employed a heightened scrutiny rather than the deferential
rational basis inquiry.
19
A more convincing argument is that the majority's approach
calls for a nearly limitless commerce power. Very few noncommercial
activities are not in some way connected to the stream of interstate
commerce. Lopez rejected the government's argument precisely be-
cause its logic would have created a general federal police power,
leaving nothing beyond the reach of the federal government's author-
ity.220  Allowing the federal government to regulate acts of trespass
and assault committed by some anti-abortion protesters simply be-
cause the reproductive health facilities they target purchase supplies
from out-of-state or because some people travel across state lines to
obtain reproductive health services broadens the commerce power
beyond recognition. 22' Lopez may be a limited holding, but it resur-
rected after sixty years the notion that limits to the Commerce Clause
exist. The FACE Act exceeds any meaningful limits.
216. See id. at 681 (discussing how persons traveling interstate to obtain reproductive
health services have a substantial impact on interstate commerce while those traveling to shop
or play golf do not).
217. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 300 (describing congressional testimony that "discrimination
in restaurants had a direct and highly restrictive effect upon interstate travel by Negros....
This obviously discourages travel and obstructs interstate commerce for one can hardly travel
without eating").
218. Perez, 402 U.S. at 155 (describing congressional testimony that loan sharking was "the
second largest source of revenue for organized crime").
219. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 698 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (evaluating congressional findings
that abortion protests affect interstate commerce carefully despite criticism that this elevates
the rational basis inquiry to one of strict scrutiny).
220. 116 S. Ct. at 1632 ("m[f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."). See
also Merritt, 94 Mich. L. Rev. at 688 (cited in note 99) ("Although pressed repeatedly during oral
arguments, the Solicitor General could not offer a single example of conduct falling outside
Congress's commerce power.") (citing Transcript of Oral Argument on Behalf of the Petitioner at
10-11, 13, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995) (available in
Westlaw, SCT-ORALARG Directory)).
221. See Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 630-33 (describing the implications of congressional
justifications for the FACE Act).
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V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
If Lopez proved fatal to the FACE Act's commerce clause
authority, a court would be required to analyze the Act under the
other independent constitutional basis Congress offered-section five
of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 2 If this authority failed, Congress
could pass a new FACE Act with a jurisdictional element linking the
crime to interstate commerce. Alternatively, Congress could allow
state law to handle the problem.
A. An Alternate Source of Power
Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the
power to enforce section one of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 3 Section
one prohibits the states from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law" and from denying any person
the "equal protection of the laws." 224 Therefore, section five only gives
Congress the authority to regulate state action.
Whether one adopts the view that the FACE Act regulates
private protesters or private abortion clinics, the act does not regulate
state action. Nevertheless, the Court has indicated that private activ-
ity may constitute state action for fourteenth amendment purposes in
limited circumstances when the activity is intertwined with state
authority.2 5 The Court has found state action in four such situ-
ations:26  (1) "when there is a symbiotic relationship between the
private actor and the state";227 (2) when private discrimination is
222. See note 111. In Wilson, although the district court held the FACE Act unconstitu-
tional under the Fourteenth Amendment, 880 F. Supp. at 636, the dissent in the Seventh
Circuit opinion did not analyze the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wilson, 73
F.3d at 679 n.4. In Hoffman, the court briefly considered the fourteenth amendment question
before concluding that the activities of private protesters did not satisfy the state action re-
quirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. 923 F. Supp. at 819-20.
223. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article." U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 5.
224. Id. § 1.
225. "Although the conduct of private parties lies beyond the Constitution's scope in most
instances, governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its partici-
pants must be deemed to act with the authority of the government and, as a result, be subject to
constitutional constraints." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991).
226. Sherman v. Community Consol. School Dist. 21 of Wheeling Township, 8 F.3d 1160,
1168-69 (7th Cir. 1993) (outlining the four categories).
227. Id. at 1168. See, for example, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715,
722-24 (1961) (holding that a private restaurant that leased from a state agency was a state




"aggravated" by a governmental authority;28 (3) "when the state has
commanded or encouraged the private discriminat[ion]";229 and (4)
when the private actor performs a "traditional state function."230
None of these four scenarios is present in the context of the
FACE Act. No symbolic relationship exists between the protesters
and the state. Also, the state has neither enforced a judgment giving
effect to discrimination, nor been responsible for encouraging dis-
crimination. Finally, private abortion protesters do not perform a
traditional state function. Accordingly, no plausible argument exists
that these private protests are intertwined with state authority.
Advocates of the FACE Act might nonetheless argue that
Congress has authority under section five to regulate activity that
Congress has determined violates section one. In Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 31 the Court stated that Congress itself may determine that a
state law violates section one and thus implement legislation correct-
ing the discrimination under section five. 23 2  Even under Morgan's
expansive rationale, the FACE Act should not survive because it does
not correct discrimination caused by state law. Morgan, however,
does not appear to authorize Congress to determine that purely pri-
vate action could violate section one despite the express state action
language in section one. In addition, the authority of Morgan is ques-
tionable because the Court has not followed it in subsequent cases.
Finally, FACE Act supporters may argue that by refusing to
prosecute offenders, government actors deprived women of their
fourteenth amendment right to be free from state interference in
obtaining an abortion.233 Such a charge would be difficult to substan-
tiate. While the Senate Report on the FACE bill cited testimony by a
Texas sheriff who refused to enforce the law against pro-life demon-
228. Sherman, 8 F.3d at 1168. See, for example, Shelly v. Kraemner, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1948) (finding state action when a court enforced racially discriminatory restrictive covenants).
229. Sherman, 8 F.3d at 1168. See, for example, Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). In
Blum, the Court found that private nursing homes receiving Medicaid reimbursements were not
state actors. Id. at 105. The state was not responsible for the nursing homes' decisions to
transfer certain patients to less expensive facilities and thus lower their Medicaid benefits. Id.
at 1007-09. The Court observed that a state could only be held responsible for these decisions if
it "has exercised coercive power or has provided... significant encouragement" in the decision.
Id. at 1004.
230. Sherman, 8 F.3d at 1169. See, for example, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70
(1953) (holding preprimary elections to be a state function).
231. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
232. Id. at 656 ("[It is enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress might predi-
cate a judgment that the application of New York's [requirement] ... constituted an invidious
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.").
233. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 683 n.8 (discussing hypothetically the government's claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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strators,234 no other evidence was shown. The dissenting views of the
House Report pointed to the sheriffs testimony that his fellow law
enforcement officers were not reluctant to enforce the law.235
Furthermore, testimony showed that state and local officials in many
areas of the country had prosecuted the protesters effectively. 2 6 Even
so, no case law exists for the proposition that failure to enforce state
law constitutes a violation of section one's substantive due process
requirements. If the Court found such activity to be a violation, sec-
tion five appears only to give Congress the authority to prevent the
state from violating section one-that is, to prevent the state from
refusing to enforce the state law, not to implement its own regulations
directed at the protesters.
B. A Stronger Nexus
If the FACE Act failed under the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could remedy the law by drafting a
new act with a nexus requirement linking the regulated activity,
through case-by-case inquiry, to interstate commerce. 237 For instance,
Congress could prohibit crossing or conspiring across state lines with
intent to obstruct access to a reproductive health facility.238 Such a
clause would address the real concern of the legislation-that of hun-
dreds of "professional" protesters descending upon a local clinic,
overwhelming the local justice system. At the same time, however,
such a statute would allow local authorities to govern local protests.
C. Surrender to the States
The final alternative would be for Congress to abandon the
FACE Act altogether and allow the states to handle the regulation of
this matter. State and local laws of trespass, assault, murder, and
arson are adequate to deal with the problems addressed by the FACE
Act. Some states have enacted their own statutes similar to the
234. Senate Report at 19 (cited in note 122).
235. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, H.R. Rep. No. 103-306, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 22-23, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 717-18 ('House Report').
236. Id. Police in Wichita, Kansas, arrested 2,700 people at a demonstration; officials in
Buffalo, New York, arrested 500. Id.
237. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (acknowledging the efficacy of such a case-by-case
jurisdictional requirement).
238. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life after Lopez,
46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 801, 812 (1996) (suggesting that Congress could have "prohibited
crossing state lines with intent to possess a firearm in a school zone" to cure the Gun-Free
School Zones Act).
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FACE Act, specifically proscribing obstructing access to health care
facilities.2 39  Other states address these concerns through criminal
trespass laws240 or by finding civil contempt for violating injunctions
or restraining orders.2 41 If state and local law enforcement officers are
overwhelmed by demonstrators, they have independent statutory
authority to request federal reinforcements.242
This discussion raises larger normative questions of whether
the criminal law should be primarily a state or federal concern.
Historically, criminal law has been considered to be almost exclu-
sively within the states' domain.243 More recently, the increased mo-
bility of criminals, accompanied by the expansion of the Commerce
Clause, has led to a great growth in the scope of federal criminal
239. See, for example, Cal. Penal Code § 602.11 (West, 1996 Supp.); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-
3721(2) (1995); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 266, § 120E (West, 1996 Supp.); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
277.4 (Michie, 1995); Wis. Stat. § 943.145 (West, 1996).
The Massachusetts statute provides:
Whoever knowingly obstructs entry to or departure from any medical facility or who en-
ters or remains in any medical facility so as to impede the provision of medical services,
after notice to refrain from such obstruction or interference, shall be punished for the
first offense by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or not more than six months
in jail .... and for each subsequent violation of this section by a fine of not less than five
hundred dollars and not more than five thousand dollars or not more than two and one-
half years in jail ....
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 266, § 120E.
240. For example, Connecticut makes "obstructing free passage" a class C misdemeanor,
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-182a (West, 1994), punishable by imprisonment not to exceed three
months, id. § 53a-36, and a fine not to exceed $500, id. § 53a-4z. Similarly, Connecticut defines
criminal trespass in the third degree as a class C misdemeanor: "A person is guilty of criminal
trespass in the third degree when, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so: (1) He
enters or remains in premises which are posted in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably
likely to come to the attention of intruders .... " Id. § 53a-109(a).
241. See, for example, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2727.11 (West, 1994) (granting a court the
authority to enforce an injunction or restraining order under the court's contempt powers); id. §
2727.12 (imposing a fine of not more than $200 and restitution to the injured party for the
breach of an injunction).
242. Justice Kennedy summarized this possible source of federal reinforcement in his Bray
concurrence:
Should state officials deem it necessary, law enforcement assistance is authorized upon
request by the State to the Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 10501. In the event of a law enforcement emergency as to which "State and local re-
sources are inadequate to protect the lives and property of citizens or to enforce the
criminal law," § 10502(3), the Attorney General is empowered to put the full range of
federal law enforcement resources at the disposal of the State, including the resources of
the United States Marshals Service ....
506 U.S. at 287-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
243. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief- The Federalization of American Criminal
Law, 46 Hastings L. J. 1135, 1139 (1995) (describing how "[n]arrowly drawn federal crimes were
tailored to provide protections in matters of direct federal interest or matters that the states
were powerless to address-theft from a federal bank by a bank employee, arson on a federal
vessel outside of any state's jurisdiction, immigration and customs offenses, tax fraud, and
smuggling") (citations omitted).
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law.244 Today, federal criminal law prohibits carjacking,245 drive-by
shootings,24 and domestic violence. 247 Congress is now well practiced
at federalizing state law crimes, usually making the penalties more
severe. This urge to "get tough on crime" has overwhelmed congres-
sional federalism concerns.2 48 Chief Justice Rehnquist himself has
warned that the federalization of crime threatens to overwhelm the
federal court system. 249
Stronger penalties for federal crimes give prosecutors the
choice of whether to choose a less severe or more severe punishment
for the same act.250 The harsher state regulations punish trespassers
by imprisonment of up to one year and a fine of up to $1,000.251 Such
penalties do not begin to approach the FACE Act penalties for nonvio-
lent obstructors: up to six months in prison and a $10,000 fine for the
first offense and up to eighteen months and $25,000 for subsequent
offenses. 252  This consequence of federalization raises problems of
arbitrary punishments because a government official may prosecute
under a more severe federal statute or a less severe state statute
without explanation.253 It also results in a loss of democratic account-
ability. State and local officials are not held accountable for main-
244. Id. at 1141-45 (describing the development of federal criminal jurisdiction).
245. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994 ed.).
246. Drive-By Shooting Prevention Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 36 (1994 ed.).
247. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 40221, 108 Stat. 1926-27, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994 ed.).
248. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 274
(BasicBooks, 1993).
249. Chief Justice's 1993 Year-End Report Highlights Cost-saving Measures, Third Branch
1, 3 (Jan. 1994). Federal district court judges have brought similar concerns:
At every meeting of federal judges that I attend there is the complaint that the Congress
is broadening federal jurisdiction to the point where we are unable to do our jobs. The
historically unique and discrete jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is being distorted.
The constant lament is that the constitutional concept of Federalism is being eviscerated
by the Congress.
United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 244 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), rev'd, United States v.
Osteen, 30 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1994). Judge Wiseman said federal jurisdiction has expanded
"only because we in the judicial branch are willing to interpret the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution so broadly." Id. at 244.
250. It is the practice of the Southern District of New York to designate one day per week
as "federal day" for drug crimes. Brickey, 46 Hastings L. J. at 1159 (cited in note 243).
251. See, for example, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 810.09 (West, 1994) (providing that trespass on
property "other than a structure or conveyance" is a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable
by up to one year in prison, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.082(4)(a) (West, 1994), and a $1,000 fine, id.
§ 775.084(1)(d)).
252. 18 U.S.C. § 248(b)(2).
253. See Brickey, 46 Hastings L. J. at 1159-60 (cited in note 243) (discussing the implica-
tions of this choice in the area of drug crimes).
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taining appropriate sentencing because Congress steps in to improve
the law.254
Transforming state crimes to federal offenses through the use
of the Commerce Clause has a detrimental effect on the balance of
power between federal and state governments. While the Lopez Court
has shown no sign of retreating from this basic element for federal
crimes, Congress should reexamine its philosophy of making crime a
federal concern. The concerns of the FACE Act are better addressed
by state criminal law.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lopez calls for a return to some restrictions on the Commerce
Clause. While the Lopez Court did not completely abandon the post-
New Deal expansive Commerce Clause, it did resist the notion that
the Commerce Clause may be used to regulate any and all activities
having an effect on interstate commerce. Under Lopez, the FACE Act
should be struck down because it implies an unlimited federal com-
merce power. The fact that it has been almost universally upheld
reflects the reluctance of the judiciary to question the linchpin upon
which so much federal legislation hangs. The courts are also reluc-
tant to overturn a law that furthers an important policy objec-
tive-eliminating obstruction and violence at abortion clinics. Indeed,
the success of the law in achieving a reduction in the number of vio-
lent incidents at these cinicS2 55 would convince many of the need to
affirm its constitutionality. Nevertheless, such an approach ignores
the importance of our federal structure. Federalism concedgdly sacri-
fices some efficiency in order to protect individual liberty, but like the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, the FACE Act regulates activity that can
be adequately addressed by state law.
Lopez reminds us that the courts play an important institu-
tional role in policing the federal/state boundary. It is precisely the
function of the courts to determine whether the federal government
254. Brickey, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 841-42 (cited in note 238) (noting that the National
Association of Attorneys General and other state organizations have "expressed serious con-
cerns about the rampant centralization of power, particularly police power, in the federal
government").
255. A recent study by the National Abortion Federation shows that "violent protests at
abortion clinics have decreased sharply in the 28 months since Congress" passed the FACE Act.
Robert Pear, After New Lau), Abortion-Clinic Protests Fall, N.Y. Times D25 (Sept. 24, 1996)
(reporting that "there had been fewer than 400 incidents of violence and disruption this year,
down from 1,815 in all of 1995, 1,987 in 1994 and 3,429 in 1993").
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has the authority to enact a given statute. Upholding commerce
clause legislation with only remote links to interstate commerce lends
judicial endorsement to the expansion of the federal government's
jurisdiction.
Whether or not courts follow Lopez's call for realistic limits to
the commerce power, Congress should assume a more responsible role
in protecting federalism. Congress should examine more carefully
whether a problem can be handled by the states or whether it re-
quires a national solution. The reflexive use of case-specific jurisdic-
tional requirements may be a particularly tempting way to federalize
criminal law under Lopez's interpretation of the Commerce Clause.
By nationalizing criminal regulations that can be adequately handled
by state and local authorities, Congress has enlarged federal power at
too great an expense to federalism.
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